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THE UNITED STATES' INVOLVEMENT
IN HAmI'S TRAGEDY AND THE
RESOLVE TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY
I. INTRODUCTION
Haitian boat people have had the misfortune of attempting to
immigrate to the United States in the midst of an economic recession and
during a time of political pressure stemming from the 1992 presidential
campaign. In addition, the immigration of Haitians in such large numbers
has aroused fear that the United States would bear the brunt of Haiti's
problems from the upheaval of September 1991, just as the United States
was compelled to sustain Cuba's problems in 1980 and again in the
summer of 1994.1
According to statistics from the National Coalition for Haitian
Refugees, as of November 16, 1994, 63,771 Haitians have been
interdicted since the beginning of 1991.2
1. Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of U.S. Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees
Under International Hwnan Rights.Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2335, 2337-39 (1991). The 1980
Mariel boat lift brought 125,000 Cubans to the United States to escape Fidel Castro's
dictatorship. In August and September 1992, approximately 1,000 Cubans arrived on
Florida's shores seeking asylum. See William Booth, Flow of Cuban Refugees to Florida
Is Increasing: 2,205 Have Made 90-Mile Voyage This Year, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1992,
at A3. This influx of Cuban refugees represents almost half of the total number that
arrived the year before. It was the largest Cuban migration to Florida since the Mariel
boat lift. "Under United States immigration laws Cubans are allowed to apply for and be
given legal residence more quickly than any other national group." Larry Rohter, New
Wave of Cubans Sails to Florida Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1992, at Al, A19. The
Bush Administration argued that, unlike the majority of Haitians seeking asylum in the
United States, Cubans are political refugees, not merely economic refugees. Id.
2. Statistics provided by National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, New York, N.Y.,
November 16, 1994 [hereinafter Statistics]. After the Haitian boat people are returned to
Haiti, they must go to the American Embassy and follow the same procedures to apply
for political asylum as those required in other countries. Thomas C. Palmer, Jr., When
Is Asylwn Juasfied? Haiti's Proimity Helps Fuel Emotional Debate, BOSTON GLOBE, May
31, 1992, at 73. However, many have pointed out that there is such a high standard of
proof in order to show qualification for political asylum that very few Haitians may be
admitted on such grounds. Those who have no proof of persecution, but only argue that
they have well-founded fears of persecution, are routinely denied approval. In-Country
Refugee Processing: Is It a Real Alternative?, HAItI IN SiGWT, Winter 1992, at 4.
According to the U.S. State Department, as of September 18, 1992, the total number of
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
Haiti, a Caribbean nation of approximately seven million inhabitants,
has an annual, rural per capita income of less than three hundred dollars.3
Faced with a long history of famine, health problems,4 and political
upheaval, the tens of thousands of Haitians attempted to migrate to
Florida's shores, and many succeeded.
This Note focuses on the strife suffered by the Haitian people as a
result of the coup of 1991 that toppled Haiti's first democratically elected
president, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the legal turmoil that faced
the U.S. government. In so doing, this Note will analyze the legal battles
fought between the United States government and the Haitian people and
their representatives, Executive Orders promulgated by former Presidents
Reagan and Bush, as well as the initial, self-imposed pressures cast upon
President Clinton to restore democracy or not return Haitians to their
country.
I maintain that the resolve to restore democracy in Haiti, as authorized
by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, was the best
solution to end the suffering in Haiti, safely protect our borders from the
surge of illegal immigration, and fulfill the purpose of the interdiction
program.
II. THE POLmCAL HISTORY OF THE HAITIAN REGIME
"It is a land of voodoo and abject poverty, where dictators have
traditionally held power."' The year 1986 was significant for marking the
end of Haiti's Duvalier dictatorship.6 After "Papa Doc" Duvalier died in
1971, his son Jean-Claude Duvalier, otherwise known as "Baby Doc",
maintained the Duvalier regime for fifteen years.7 After aiding the
Duvalier family's escape into exile, United States officials tried to compel
Haitian authorities to initiate democratic election processes, draft a new
Haitians registered in the Embassy database is 15,133; 9,4.47 had completed the
preliminary questionnaire; 1,968 cases had been adjudicated and only 229 Haitians were
approved. Statistics, supra.
3. Paul Farmer et al., Tuberculosis, Poverty, and 'Conpliance : Lessons from Rural
Haiti, 6 SEMINARS iN RESPIRATORY INFECTIONS 254 (1991).
4. Id.
5. Mary Nemeth et al., A Priestfor a President, MAcLEAN'S, Dec. 31, 1990, at 40.
6. From 1957 to 1986, the Duvalier family reigned over Haiti with an "iron fist." Id.
7. Michael Tarr, After Papa and Baby Doc Haiti Finds a New Father, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 23, 1990, at 16.
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constitution, and revise the "notoriously corrupt military and civilian
bureaucracies. "'
Since the overthrow of President-for-life Jean-Claude Duvalier, Haiti
has had three military dictatorships, a brief "civilian puppet regime", and
a weak provisional government led by former Supreme Court Justice Ertha
Pascal Trouillot.9 The United States' efforts to positively influence the
Haitian army and political leadership"°  proved disappointingly
unsuccessful.
The United States favored several army commanders to no avail."
Lieutenant General Henri Namphy was overthrown in 1987, shortly after
he allowed the destruction of a presidential election by the army." Then,
General Prosper Avril took control in 1988 and began to implement
reforms in the Haitian government; however, he was banished in six
months' time." Finally, General Herard Abraham, who served in the
provisional government under Trouillot's leadership, declared his
dedication to reforming Haiti's government and its undisciplined army."'
General Abraham began where General Avril left off by quietly retiring
a multitude of corrupt and ruthless officers and disbanding several
pernicious special military units."5 Most significant to the political reforms
in Haiti, however, was General Abraham's commitment to creating a safe,
fair arena for holding democratic elections in Haiti. 16
On December 16, 1990, almost five years after the fall of the
Duvalier dictatorship, Haitians participated in the first democratic
presidential election 7 since Haiti gained its independence from France 186
8. Pamela Constable, For the U.S.. No Choice but Optimism After Haiti Vote, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1990, at 4.
9. Anne Fuller & Kenneth Roth, Haiti: The kistde Governent's Hwnan Rights
Record, AMERICAS WATCH, THE NAT'L CoALrIoN FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES AND
CARMBEAN RTS., Nov. 1, 1991, at 1, 7.






16. Id. As the head of an observer delegation, former President Jinmy Carter oversaw
the first democratic election in Haiti. He stated, "When I spoke to General Namphy in
1987, it was obvious in five minutes he didn't support the elections. But General
Abraham seems convinced his life work and institution will be best served by a successful
vote." Id.
17. Fuller & Roth, supra note 9, at 7.
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years ago." In that election, the Haitian people elected Father Jean-
Bertrand Aristide president.1 '
Father Aristide, a 37-year-old Roman Catholic priest known for his
powerful oratories denouncing the Duvalier family,2 had previously
survived two attacks on his life by Duvalier supporters. 21 He declared his
candidacy for presidency at the end of October 1990, shortly before the
deadline for nominations.? His announcement brought with it widespread
excitement among Haitians everywhere s Aristide, however, was probably
not the candidate that the Bush administration would have chosen for
Haiti's presidency,' as his campaign oratory was fervent with anti-
American sentiment.' Nonetheless, despite the revolutionary priest's
history of hostility toward the United States, the United States government
committed itself to ensuring the legitimacy of Haiti's presidential election.
The United States invested significant amounts of money and time to
effectively and zealously attain this end,' thereby marking the beginning
of a political democracy for Haiti. Days before the election, United States
officials remained publicly neutral when asked about the priestly
presidential candidate.' However when Aristide'a landslide victory was
obvious, to confirm their commitment to a democratic outcome, United
States officials immediately congratulated Aristide as the "clear winner"
18. Nemeth et al., supra note 5, at 40.
19. Fuller & Roth, supra note 9, at 7. The nine-member Provisional Electoral Council
appointed by President Trouillot, the United Nations, and the Organization of the
American States (OAS), oversaw the election processes to ensure that the elections were
conducted freely, fairly and successfully. Id.
20. Nemeth et al., supra note 5, at 40.
21. Fuller & Roth, supra note 9, at 7.
22. Id.
23.Id.
24. Constable, supra note 8, at 4.
25. Nemeth et al., supra note 5, at 40.
26. Constable, supra note 8, at 4.




and pledged to support his government.' A democratic outcome was
exactly what the United States government had worked to achieve.29
III. SHORT-LIVED DEMOCRACY IN HAITI
On February 7, 1991, Haiti inaugurated Father Jean-Bertrand
Aristide.30 In the first months of his presidency, Aristide, who had
previously denounced capitalism as sinful,3 surprised many of his critics.
They feared he would implement socialist government policies indicative
of the 1970s,3 2 but instead he formulated moderate macro-economic
28. Id. United States officials certainly tried to sound positive about the election of
a "stated opponent of American foreign policy and aid" by emphasizing the United States
commitment to the democratic vote of two million Haitians. Id. Many believe, however,
that U.S. support would be somewhat contingent upon Aristide's willingness to renounce
his most extremist positions and adopt more moderate ones. Id. Ultimately, Aristide did
prove to be a much more moderate candidate than "Aristide the militant Liberation
Theology priest who lambasted 'US imperialism'... and said shanty-town vigilantes had
a right to lynch Macoutes as long as the judiciary's bias continued." Tarr, supra note 7,
at 16.
29. Tarr, supra note 7, at 16. The United States government is Haiti's biggest foreign
aid donor. Id.
30. Fuller & Roth, supra note 9, at 8. The Electoral Council's final tallies, made
public on January 14, 1991, showed that Aristide had won 67.48% of the vote. Clearly,
he was the overwhelming winner of the 12 candidates. Marc Bazin, Aristide's closest
rival, received 14.22% of the votes. Ild. at 7. On January 6 and 7, before his February
inauguration, Aristide withstood an attempted coup d'itat led by former Tontons Macoutes
Chief Roger Lafontant. Id. For some optimists, Aristide's endurance through this
political upheaval may have momentarily dispelled any ominous indications that a
successful coup could occur. The attempted coup should not have come as a surprise.
Nor should Aristide's endurance have quelled fears of another coup by the Duvaliers'
infamous Tontons Macoutes militia and from military officers who had mounted three
coups in the five years preceding Aristide's election. One of the more pessimistic authors
correctly predicted that "even the priest-president may not be able to work miracles."
Nemeth et al., supra note 5, at 40. Furthermore, the remnants of the feared Tontons
Macoutes militia had every motive to assassinate Aristide, who was the arch adversary of
Duvalierism. In addition, since the regime's fall in 1986, the Tontons Macoutes militia
was responsible for the execution of political murders and coups. Aristide has
"campaigned more than anyone for political blood crimes to be brought to trial." Tarr,
supra note 7, at 16.
31. J.P. Slavin, Global Donors Pledge Haiti $ 442 Million, HArr INSIGHT, Sept. 1991,
at 2 [hereinafter Slavin, Global Donors]. During a July 12, 1991 interview, Aristide
firmly stated: "I have the same idea about capitalism, I sl continue to believe capitalism
is a mortal sin." Id. Aristide is also an ardent critic of foreign investment and foreign
aid. Id. at 1.
32. Id.
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policies reflecting capitalism typical of the 1990s.1 Many analysts grew
confident that Aristide's five year term would provide Haiti with long-
needed political stability. 
3
During Aristide's first six months in office, tension mounted between
the executive branch and its elite Lavalas' supporters on one side and the
parliamentarians and the National Front for Change and Democracy on the
other, the latter being the coalition for whom Aristide was the presidential
candidate.36 As a result of this conflict, little attention was given to
Aristide's accomplishments during his first six months in office."
Aristide's reforms included his attempt to assemble a Haitian army that
respected human rights.3" As another step toward achieving his goal,
Aristide announced his intention to set up a commission that would address
current human rights concerns and seek justice for past crimes. 9
Although Aristide had not yet implemented the commission when the coup
ended his tenure, he did take action against a number of people believed
to be responsible for heinous crimes of the past.'
33. Id.
34. Haiti, listed among the twenty-five least developed countries, is the poorest
republic in the Western Hemisphere. The "lack of political stability" is the single most
contributory factor, to Haiti's political and economic environment, claim Haitian
economists. ld.
35. "Lavalas" refers to the popular movement responsible for Aristide's election.
Fuller & Roth, supra note 9, at 24.
36. Slavin, Global Donors, supra note 31, at 3.
37. Id.
38. Fuller & Roth, supra note 9, at 8. Aristide focused much of his attention on
reforming the structure of the institutions most responsible for the oppression and
victimization of Haitians, namely, the army, the section chief system, and the Haitian
National Penitentiary administration. Id. at 3. "Since 1986, the military has been the
chief barrier to democracy in Haiti .... Duvalierist forces, including former members
of the Tontons Macoutes militia, have been able to block democratic progress only when
they were able to secure the army's collaboration." Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 14.
40. Id. "Nikol Poitevien, a major landowner implicated in the July 23, 1987, massacre
of hundreds of peasants in Jean-Rabel in Haiti's Northwest, was arrested in March 1991.'
Id. The Jean-Rabel massacre was the largest in Haiti's recent history. In April, five
additional suspects were arrested and released soon after for alleged lack of evidence.
Many believe that political pressure from influential individuals was the reason for their
quick release. Nikol Poitevien had still not gone to trial when Aristide was overthrown
in September 1992. Id.
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IV. THE CouP THAT TOPPLED HAITI'S FIRsT DEMOCRACY
On September 30, 1991, Aristide's government faced its second
attempted military coup d'itat.4 1 This one proved successful. The coup
was, in part, a response to Aristide's attempts to reform and control
Haiti's rebel army.42 To a larger extent, however, Haiti's coup d'itat was
a response to Aristide's aggressive attacks on "the exploitative status quo
in his country." 4 Traditionally, Haiti's economic elite, known for its
ardent abhorrence of democracy, maintained political and economic
control over the people. The coup was the elite's violent response to
Aristide's firm commitment to democratic reform, and the military action
taken only confirmed the elite's anti-democratic stance."
Less than a day after the coup, its organizers and promoters began to
justify the overthrow of Aristide by claiming that his government
perpetuated human rights abuses.4' Military troops, who killed more than
three hundred civilians in the process of toppling Haiti's first popularly-
elected government, hypocritically criticized Aristide's government for
alleged human rights abuses." Nevertheless, because these allegations
were so serious, they warranted some investigation as to their validity. In
addition, the military's appointment of Jean-Jacques Honorat, a leading
human rights advocate, as prime minister of their provisional government,
raised suspicion that these charges had some merit.
41. Id. at 1.
42. Amy Wilentz, Coup d'tat in Haiti, HAITI INscHr, Oct. 1991, at 1.
43. Id.
44. Id. In the October 1991 issue of Haiti Insight, Amy Wilentz was still optimistic
that the coup ditat would not be successful in ousting Aristide from his popularly elected
office because of popular pressure from Haitians everywhere and Aristide's "incontestable
legitimacy." Id. at 6. Wilentz wrote, "Aristide may become the third world's first
deposed democratic leader ever to be reinstated .... Certainly Haitians are virtually
unanimous in their rejection of this regime. Sometimes history repeats itself only as a last
gasp of an old, dying world." Id. Wilentz probably did not expect, however, that
Aristide's reinstatement would occur three years later.
45. Fuller & Roth, supra note 9, at 1.
46. Id.
47. Id. On August 13, 1991, Jean-Iacques Honorat was one of three recipients of the
American Bar Association's International Human Rights award. The award honors
lawyers and judges whose work and dedication promote the advancement and enforcement
of human rights and justice in foreign countries. J.P. Slavin, Human Rights Activist
Honored, HArI INSIGHT, Sept. 1991, at 1, 5. Honorat's contribution to human rights
efforts for Haitians is extensive. An agronomist and lawyer, Honorat co-founded and is
executive director of the Institute for Technology and Organizing ("ITECA"), "an agency
19941
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Aristide received criticism for his failure to discourage the rise in
Haiti's popular violence." Many Haitians, indeed Aristide supporters,
took it upon themselves to compensate for Haiti's dysfunctional legal
system.49 Some of Aristide's supporters threatened to lynch those in
opposition to Aristide and his government." Aristide made little or no
attempt to curb these "summary justice" practices.51 In fact, "in a
disturbing deviation from his stated commitment to human rights,
President Aristide voiced a certain tolerance for this popular violence as
a substitute for the profound reforms of the legal system that were
needed." 2 Ironically, this tolerance perpetuated lawlessness by deterring
lawyers from taking unpopular clients, thereby impeding access to the
courts.5 3
Although Aristide should not necessarily be blamed for inciting the
violent practices performed by his followers, he deserves the blame for not
that supports empowerment of Haitian peasants by providing training in literacy,
agricultural techniques, community health and human rights." Exiled in New York in
1983, after being arrested and banished from Hati by lean-Claude DuvaYier's government,
Honorat founded the Haitian Center for Human Rights ("CHADEL"). In 1986, Honorat
finally established CHADEL in Haiti after the Duvalier dictatorship fell. CHADEL is
nationally known for "documenting human rights abuses and promoting human rights
education." CHADEL has also assisted in prison reform in the Haitian National
Penitentiary, a prisoner assistance organization that provides legal counsel, and offers
annual human rights seminars for interested lawyers, students and government officials.
CHADEL also takes an active intervention role for abuse victims by promoting public
awareness and by sending letters directly to government officials. Id.
48. Fuller & Roth, supra note 9, at 18.
49. Id. "Since the fall of the Duvalier dynasty, 'dechoukage,' or uprooting, in which
people take the law into their own hands, has been a recurrent form of alternative
'justice,' and uu+il yeceutly, it was th only kind of '3ustize' [1{aitian ptople. tier
experienced on their behalf." Id. at 19.
50. Id. at 18.
51. Id. "Lynching of suspected criminals continued to occur at approximately the same
pace as it had under most of the Trouillot government's tenure." Id.
52. Id. at 3. Rarely did Aristide's government intervene to stop instances of popular
violence, several of which included the burning down of trade union offices, looting the
offices of a popular organization, and severely beating a deputy from Port-de-Paix. Id.
at 18, 20. "A survey of human rights violations during the Aristide government's first
seven months in office . . . turns up twenty-five instances of people killed in mob
lynching." Id at 22.
53. Id. at 19. "Haiti's long history of entrenched lawlessness-dominated by corrupt
dictators, presidents-for-life, and military strongmen, backed by a cowed and ineffectual
judicial system, and sustained by police forces that answered only to the army-has bred
resort to 'popular justice' as the only form of redress for the overwhelming majority of
the population without access to or confidence in the courts." Id.
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using his persuasive moral authority' to speak out forcefully against such
practices.' Instead, several of Aristide's public speeches actually
endorsed "summary justice" practices.5 '
Jean-Jacques Honorat, Haiti's de facto prime minister, attempted to
justify the coup d' Iaf. 7 He blamed Aristide and his government for its
demise. 58 Honorat characterized Aristide's overthrow not as a coup d'dtat,
but rather, as "an accident due to the infancy of Haiti's democratic
structures.""' He claimed that Aristide and his government officials were
not democrats'e and alleged that "there was a systematic disrespect of
human rights"6 under their leadership. Honorat claimed that "the coup
was provoked by the comportment of those in power. It was a reaction
by the social body politic, and force had to be exerted by the only part of
the social body with arms: the army." 62
54. Id. at 24.
55. Id. Many believe that Aristide could have prevented much of the violence and
bloodshed by publicly condemning such behavior. Id.
56. Id. at 25. In a September 27, 1991 speech, just days before the coup that ousted
him, Aristide said "[t]hroughout the four corners of the country, we are watching, we are
praying, we are watching, we are praying, when we catch one of them, don't neglect to
give him what he deserves." Id.
57. Anne Fuller & Amy Wilentz, Return to the Darkest Days: Human Rights in Haiti
Since the Coup, AMERICAS WATCH, NAT'L COALrTION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES,
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RTS., Dec. 1991, at 1, 16.
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id.
60. Id. Honorat claims that "there is no relationship between elections and
democracy." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. Furthermore, Honorat asserted that the government now in power is
constitutional. He refuted allegations that Aristide's prime minister, Rene Pre'val, was
threatened and claimed that Pre'val gave up his office by not showing up at the
parliament. Honorat explained that he became prime minister of Haiti by claiming that
he was simply asked to fill the vacancy. Honorat stated: "It was perfectly legal and in
strict conformity with the constitution. I felt I had to defend my nation against injustice,
and therefore I accepted a position [the office of prime minister] that is totally against my
concept of my life. I have never wanted to be in politics. But because of the
[Organization of American States] illegal intervention, my country was exposed to civil
war; indeed, it is still exposed to civil war. After all, I am a patriot...." Id. Honorat
also insists that there is no connection between the post-coup government and the coup d'
etat. Id.
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V. THE U.S. RESPONSE: CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR ARISTIDE
Immediately after the coup, the Bush Administration announced its
support for and maintained its recognition of Aristide as the "sole
legitimate Haitian head of state,"6 despite some of its concerns about
human rights abuses during Aristide's governance. On September 30,
1991, the United States Embassy and the State Department wasted no time
in issuing statements condemning the coup and its perpetrators." A White
House statement read, "[w]e condemn those who have attacked the legally
constituted democratically elected government of Haiti, and call for an
immediate halt to violence, and the restoration of democracy in Haiti. We
will be working closely with the OAS (Organization of American States)
to bring that about."' On October 29, 1991, the Bush Administration
suspended all trade with Haiti, excluding food, medical supplies, and
commercial flights."
The trade embargo, however, had little success. The majority of
Haitian people suffered, while the military and the elites were skilled at
63. Id. at 18.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id. Many hoped that the "international condemnation and economic sanctions
would overwhelm the perpetrators of the coup, swiftly restoring democracy to Haiti."
Embargo, Negotiations Fail to Dislodge Coup, HAri INSIGHT, Winter 1992, at 1, 3
[hereinafter Negotiations Fail]. When the United States suspended economic assistance
to Haiti on October 2, 1991, it announced that its objective was to wage a pressure
campaign in cooperation with other Latin American and Caribbean nations in order to
restore to office Haiti's democratically-elected president, Aristide. The United States
made clear its refusal to recognize the military junta that ousted Aristide. "The United
States had appropriated $84 million in economic and food aid for Haiti, and $1.5 million
in military aid, for the 1991 fiscal year. State Department officials, however, could not
say how much of this had already been paid out and how much would be affected by [the
October 2, 19911 suspension in aid.* Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. Suspends Assistance to
Haiti and Refuses to Recognize Junta, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1991, at Al. The 1991 fiscal
year ended Monday, September 30. Id. France and Canada also responded to the coup
by suspending all their aid programs and refusing to recognize the junta. French aid
amounted to about $36 million and Canada's assistance to $8.8 million. It was also
expected that aid programs instituted after Haiti's democratic elections by the Organization
of American States, the European Community and the World Bank-which last July
[1991] raised $350 million in pledges for Haiti... would be suspended. Id.
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circumventing the embargo. 67 Most surprisingly, the embargo did not
restore democracy in Haiti."
VI. TIE HAArIN EXODUS
Since the coup, the most visible indication to Americans (especially
Floridians) of political unrest and poor economic conditions in Haiti has
been the flood of more than 63,700 Haitians" to American shores; they
arrive on unseaworthy vessels in search of better living conditions.7" Not
since 1980 have so many "boat people" fled their homes in desperation.7
The departure of thousands of Haitians from their homeland to Florida's
shores is related to an even larger movement within Haiti itself.' About
two weeks after the coup, the hopes of the Haitian people for Aristide's
reinstatement were dampened. Beginning in mid-October, hundreds of
thousands of Haitians migrated from Port-au-Prince to the provinces and
countryside in an effort to flee from the military's overtly violent
practices."
Economic hardship from the loss of jobs was undoubtedly a
significant factor contributing to the mass exodus. 4 By December 1991,
an estimated 250,000 Haitians had left Port-au-Prince.75 In comparison to
this large number of people who migrated from the city, a smaller but still
significant number of grassroots peasant and church organization leaders
moved into Port-au-Prince to camouflage themselves. 7
Many of the Haitians who brave the seas in their rickety boats do not
make it to Florida's shores. They are interdicted before they arrive. The
United States has interdicted boats of Haitian asylum-seekers, since former
President Ronald Reagan established the Haitian Migrant Interdiction
Program by an executive order issued on September 29, 1981.' President
67. Negotiations Fail, supra note 66, at 3. The majority of Haitians have supported
the embargo-induced rise in food and transportation prices only to promote the
reinstatement of Aristide as president of Haiti. Id.
68. Id.
69. Statistics, supra note 2.
70. Negotiations Fail, supra note 66, at 3.






77. Helton, supra note 1, at 2341 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. 181
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Reagan established the Haitian Migrant Interdiction Program pursuant to
his determination that illegal immigration posed a "serious national
problem detrimental to the interests of the United States." 78 The 1981
executive order authorized the United States Coast Guard to "stop and
board suspicious Haitian or unflagged vessels on the high seas, determine
if their passengers are undocumented aliens bound for the United States,
and if so, return them to Haiti." 7' The executive order stipulated,
however, that "no person who is a refugee [is to] be returned without his
consent." so
The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (the
"Protocol")" defines "refugee" as one who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country.8 2
Most importantly, the non-refoulement policy, established by and
articulated in Article 33(1) of the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, prohibits the return of a refugee to his
or her place of persecution."
There is a striking difference between the Bush Administration's
perception of the reasons for the Haitian exodus to the United States and
the perception of international advocates for refugees." The Bush
(1981-1983 Comp.)).
78. Proclamation No. 4865, 3 C.F.R. 50-51 (1981-1983 Comp.).
79. Helton, supra note 1, at 2345.
80. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. § 2 (c)(3) p. 181 (1981-1983 Comp.) "The
first interdiction took place on October 12, 1981. According to the INS (Immigration and
Naturalization Service), as of 1990, 361 boats carrying 21,461 Haitians had been
intercepted. Of these, the Coast Guard permitted only six of these interdicted Haitians to
seek asylum in the United States." Helton, supra note 1, at 2341.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Bill Frelick, Haiti: No Room at the Inn, UNTED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR
REFUGS, Sept. 1992, at 34, 35. Article 33(1) provides that no contracting state "shall
expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion." Id.
84. Howard W. French, 90 Haitians Drown as Boat Capsizes, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
[Vol. 15
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Administration claimed that most Haitians fleeing their homeland were
doing so for economic reasons.'" In contrast, international advocates for
Haitian refugees assert that the majority of Haitian refugees were flocking
to the United States to escape political persecution." Each reasoning
effectuates a different legal result since the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees does not accord refugee status to those fleeing for
economic reasons.
After Aristide's overthrow, United States officials did not immediately
repatriate Haitian refugees, as had been the practice during the 1980s
pursuant to the 1981 agreement between Haiti and the United States. 7 On
October 28, 1992, the United States embassy in Port-au-Prince noted that
there were "credible reports of indiscriminate killings, police harassment,
illegal searches and looting of private homes and of radio stations, arrests
without warrants, and detention of persons without charges and
mistreatment of persons in the custody of Haiti's de facto authorities.""
This report influenced the United States authorities' decision not to
immediately repatriate Haitian refugees.' 9
United States policies have since wavered. "The Bush
Administration's policies toward the Haitian refugees evolved in fits and
starts, influenced by election-year politics, court challenges, and the
growing numbers of asylum seekers."" On October 28, 1991, the United
States Coast Guard intercepted the first boat of Haitian refugees since the
coup9" and on November 20, 1991, after conducting their interviews, the
Coast Guard "screened out"' and forcibly repatriated this first boatload




87. Thousands Flee Hait's Terror, Fill Refugee Camps at Guantanamo, HAmI
INsiGHT, Winter 1992, at 4. The 1981 agreement authorized the United States Coast
Guard to interdict Haitian "vessels [which] may be involved in the irregular carriage of
passengers outbound from Haiti." Id. "For much of the past three decades, U.S.
governments tacitly condoned the repression of the anti-communist Duvalier regime.
Thousands of Haitians fleeing misery and oppression in rickety fishing boats were arrested
by U.S. authorities, then sent home or imprisoned in detention camps." Constable, supra
note 8, at 4.
88. Negotiations Fail, supra note 66, at 4.
89. Id.
90. Frelick, supra note 83, at 34.
91. Negotations Fail, supra note 66, at 4.
92. Frelick, supra note 83, at 34.
93. Id. In response to criticisms by Haitian refugee advocates, President George Bush
1994]
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Department stated that the decision to repatriate Haitian refugees
intercepted at sea by the Coast Guard was based on the "fear that any
action by the United States to bring large numbers of Haitians without
claim to asylum to the United States would create a massive outflow,
resulting in large numbers of deaths on the high seas."9
VI. TEE BusH ADMUNSTRATION AND TE LEGAL
BATTLES ON BEHALF OF HAITIAN REFUGEES
After the coup, the Bush Administration engaged in many legal battles
regarding the fairness or unfairness of the screening procedures" used to
determine whether refugees are political or economic refugees. Haitian
refugee advocates have expressed their concern that many Haitians who
were screened out as economic migrants might have qualified for political
refugee status. 96
defended the interdiction and repatriation policy as "fair" and as one that "does make a
distinction between economic refugees and political refugees." Id.
94. Negotiations Fail, supra note 66, at 5. On November 19, 1992, at least 120
people drowned at sea after their boat capsized in a storm off of Punta Maisi in eastern
Cuba. Id. at 4. On July 19, 1992, the day before the United States began repatriating
Haitian refugees, about 90 Haitian refugees were reported to have drowned when their
small boat capsized twenty miles north of Port-au-Prince. French, supra note 84, at A9.
Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY) accused the State Department of implementing a
"racist and vicious policy" and claimed that "this would not have happened if the refugees
were European." Negotiations Fail, supra note 66, at 5. However, three of the top five
source nations for sending immigrants to the United States have "principally black
populations." Palmer, Jr., supra note 2, at 73. In response to the statistics and to those
who claim that the policy was implemented for racist purposes, Duke Austin, a spokesman
for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, said, "So this black versus white
immigrant thing is kind of a sham." Id. "Of the 180 source nations in the world, only
13 have sent more immigraats to the U.S. shores. More that 400,000 Haitian-born
persons live in New York City alone. Nearly 2 percent of the 7.3 million immigrants
legally admitted to the United States in the last decade are Haitians." Id.
Of the 142,000 refugees permitted to enter the United States in 1992, the allotment
breakdown is as follows: "Former Soviet Union, 61,000; East Asia, 52,000; Near
East/South Asia, 6,000; Eastern Europe, 3,000; Latin America, 3,000; Unallocated,
1,000." Understanding the Bias in U.S. Refugee Poliy, HArr INSIGHT, July-Aug. 1992,
at 5 [hereinafter Understanding the Bias). However, "based on the percentage of the
originating country's population, Haiti ranks fifth over the last decade among countries
whose citizens have immigrated to the United States." Palmer, Jr., supra note 2, at 73.
95. Frelick, supra note 83, at 35.
96. Id.
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In the first of the legal battles that began in November 1991, in
Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker,' United States District Court Judge
Donald L. Graham issued a temporary restraining order that prevented the
United States government from repatriating Haitians until it could show
that it would "implement and follow procedures . . . to ensure that
Haitians with bona fide political asylum claims are not forced to return to
Haiti.""' In Baker, the plaintiffs asserted that the government's screening
processes were inadequate and that the government was violating the non-
refoulement principle by forcing Haitians to return to Haiti, the place
where they might suffer persecution upon return."
Shortly thereafter, however, the issues shifted. "What had been the
central issue-the adequacy and legitimacy of pre-asylum
screening-became a side issue." 10 The government asserted that the
adequacy of screening procedures was irrelevant. On appeal,"'1 the United
States government argued that Article 33(1) was "simply inapplicable.""°
The government asserted that Article 33(1) did not bar it from forcibly
97. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, No. 91-2635-CIV-ATKINS, 1991 WL
330942, at *1 (S.D. Fla., Nov. 19, 1991).
98. Id. The Court of Appeals then dissolved the injunction and remanded the case.
Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (1lth Cir. 1991). On remand, the
District Court reissued the injunction. Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 789 F. Supp.
1579 (S.D. Fla. 1991). The government appealed. The Court of Appeals vacated both
injunctions and again remanded the case to the district court to dismiss the action for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Haitian Refugee Center v.
Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
99. Frelick, supra note 83, at 35. Depositions taken by the Haitian Refugee Center's
lawyers revealed that the screening processes were cursory and in no way adequate for
determining whether the Haitian boat people were fleeing from credible fears of
persecution with legitimate claims to political asylum. Ira Kurzban, the leading attorney
for the Haitian Refugee Center, called the screening procedures "shocking and arbitrary."
Id. In a Congressional hearing, Kurzban testified:
INS officers readily admitted that they had interviewed hundreds of Haitians
without receiving any information about the political conditions in Haiti. They
also candidly acknowledged that they had received no training on interviewing
Haitian asylum applicants . . . This lack of knowledge extended to such
issues as not knowing who the President and Prime Minister of Haiti were.
... Immigration officers were also applying incorrect standards. One officer
could not even name all the grounds necessary to obtain asylum.
Id.
100. Frelick, supra note 83, at 35.
101. 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1245 (1992).
102. Frelick, supra note 83, at 35.
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repatriating Haitians, even if they were determined to be refugees with
credible fears for their lives and liberty." The government's argument
was two-fold. First, the government claimed that the protocol was not
self-executing;"° hence, the government maintained that only if Congress
integrated the Protocol's provisions into domestic law would the Protocol
provide a source of rights upon which the Haitians could rely. Second,
the government asserted that Article 33(1) applied only to refugees "within
the territory of the contracting State."" The government relied upon
Cassell 's French Dictionary's definition of "refouler," which is "to expel
(aliens)," and argued that the government was not violating the
refoulement principle, because in order "to expel" aliens, they must first
be present in the contracting state. "I Because the Haitians were
interdicted in international waters, they were not being expelled or
returned from the United States.10 7
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit accepted the
government's "outside the U.S. territory" argument with only a cursory
glance at Article 33(1) and promptly instructed the lower court to dismiss
on the merits those claims predicated on Article 33.108 In so ruling, the
court best served the government's interests. The United States
government can thus avoid following immigration laws by refusing to
admit thousands of Haitians into the United States, where they would, by






107. Id. This, however is a faulty argument because Article 33(1) does not specify
that the location from which a refugee may not be returned has any significance. Instead,
Article 33(1) prohibits returning a refugee to the place where his life and freedom are
jeopardized. Article 33(1) states, in pertinent part, that no contracting States "shall expel
or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened." Hence, Article 33(1) forbids any
contracting State from returning Haitian refugees to Haiti if it is determined that their lives
or liberty would be threatened upon return to Haiti. Where the refugees are being
returned from has no relevance to serving the purpose of the Article, its objective being
to prevent one from being returned to the persecution he has purposely left. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 35-36. Pursuaat to President Reagan's proclamation and executive order
of September, 1981, the following is a list of INS officer responsibilities and directives
to be followed when interdicting vessels at sea:
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In contrast, Judge Joseph W. Hatchett's keen insight provoked some
The only function INS officers are responsible for is to ensure that the United
States is in compliance with its obligations regarding actions toward refugees,
including the necessity of being keenly attuned during any interdiction program
to any evidence which may reflect an individual's well-founded fear of
persecution by his or her country of origin for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership within a particular social group or political opinion.
A. To the extent that it is, within the opinion of the Commanding Officer of
the United States Coast Guard vessel, safe and practicable, each person aboard
an interdicted vessel shall be spoken to by an INS officer, through an
interpreter. A log record shall be maintained on each such person, based on
their responses to the following inquiries:
1. Name;
2. Date of Birth;
3. Nationality;
4. Home Town (obtain sufficient information to enable a later location of the
individual to check on possible persecution);
5. All documents or Evidence Presented;
6. Why did you leave Haiti;
7. Why do you wish to go to the United States;
8. Is there any reason why you cannot return to Haiti?
B. A copy of the log prepared by the INS officers shall be provided to the
Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard vessel.
C. INS officer shall be constantly watchful for any indication (including bare
claims) that a person or persons on board the interdicted vessel may qualify as
refugees under the United Nations Convention and Protocol.
D. If there is any indication of possible qualification for refugee status by a
person or persons on board an interdicted vessel, INS officers shall conduct
individual interviews regarding such possible qualification.
E. Interviews regarding possible refugee status shall be conducted out of the
hearing of other persons.
F. If necessary, INS officers will consult with Department of State officials,
either on board, or via radio communications.
G. Individual records' shall be made of all interviews regarding possible
qualification for refugee status.
H. If the interview suggests that a legitimate claim to refugee status exists,
the person involved shall be removed from the interdicted vessel, and his or
her passage to the United States shall be arranged.
. Individual record folders shall be prepared and maintained by INS officers
in every case where a person is being sent on to the United States, and such
record folder may be used to support such person's claim in the United States.
(The individual folder shall contain a sworn statement by the applicants
concerning the claim.).
Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1501-02 (1992).
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thoughtful reasoning and spurred his dissent. Judge Hatchett reasoned that
the majority's decision rested on "the government's decision to intercept
Haitian refugees on the high seas, in international waters, to prevent them
from reaching United States territory."" In effect, preventing Haitians
from setting foot on United States territory technically enables the
government to keep its promise to the community of nations not to refuse
refugees at the border."'
The Supreme Court chose not to hear the case on the merits, in effect
upholding the Bush Administration's decision to repatriate Haitian refugees
interdicted at sea."1 Justice Blackmun, the sole dissenter from the denial
of certiorari, wrote:
Each of the issues presented-whether the United States
Government is violating the First Amendment by denying
lawyers from the Haitian Refugee Center a right of access to the
Haitians held at Guantanamo Bay; whether international or
domestic law affords the Haitians a substantive right not to be
returned to a country where they face possible persecutian; and
whether the Haitians may challenge the adequacy of procedures
employed by the United States Government to identify those
facing political persecution-is difficult and susceptible to
competing interpretations.
A quick glance at this Court's docket reveals not only that
we have room to consider these issues, but that they are at least
as significant as any we have chosen to review today. If indeed
the Haitians are to be returned to an uncertain future in their
strife-torn homeland, that ruling should come from this Court,
after full and careful consideration of the merits of their
claims."'
After certiorari was denied, the United States government continued its
screening process by re-interviewing Haitians at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
110. Frelick, supra note 83, at 35.
111. Id. at36. This is a manipulative adulteration of Article 33(1) on the part of the
government, because, as Judge Hatchett points out, "agencies of the United States
captured the refgees and are holding them on United States vessels and leased territory.*
Baker, 953 F.2d at 1515.




Consequently, many of those who had already passed the initial screening
were repatriated to Haiti for lack of claim to political asylum.114
The Haitian Centers Council ("HCC") brought an action, in Haitian
Centers Council v. McNary,"15 on behalf of all Haitians who have credible
fears of persecution upon return to Haiti and "who have been or will be
screened-in""" and subsequently repatriated. The HCC claimed that the
government had breached its duty to process asylum claims fairly.11 7 The
District Court agreed and issued injunctive relief.'18 The Supreme Court
stayed the order. 19
On May 24, 1992, President George Bush issued an executive order
that ended Haitian asylum screening aboard Coast Guard cutters", and
authorized the return of all Haitians interdicted at sea."' President Bush's
executive order, also known as the Kennebunkport Order, directed the
Coast Guard to stop vessels sailing illegally to the United States and
authorized repatriation of aliens without screening for credible asylum
claims.'" In effect, the Kennebunkport Order annulled President Reagan's
1981 order, which prohibited the return of any refugee who had a credible
asylum claim.'2
114. Michael G. Heyman,s kItLawfidfor the United States to Interdict Haitian Vessels
on the High Seas and Sunmarily Repatriate Their Occupants?, in PREVIEW OF UNrTED
STATES SUPREME COURT CASES, Issue No. 6 (1993). Many claim that the government
perpetrated additional human rights violations by conducting hearings on Guantanamo
where the refugees did not have access to legal counsel. Frelick, supra note 83, at 36.
115. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 789 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
and Memorandum and Order, No. 92 CV 1258 (E.D.N.Y. April 6, 1992).
116. Id. Because Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker was a class action on behalf of
screened-out Haitians, the Eastern District of New York held in Haitian Centers Council
v. McNary that the HCC was not collaterally estopped from bringing its injunction action.
It held that the parties and the claims in the two cases were different and granted a
preliminary injunction. Id.
117. Heyman, supra note 114.
118. Id.
119. McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 3 (1992).
120. Bush to Coast Guard: Send Them All Back, HArr INsicHT, May/June 1992, at
1.
121. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 21133-23134 (1992).
122. Heyman, supra note 114.
123. Id. Judge Sterling Johnson maintained:
It is unconscionable that the United States should accede to the Protocol and
later claim that it is not bound by it. This court is astonished that the United
States would return Haitian refugees to the jaws of political persecution, terror,
death and uncertainty when it has contracted not to do so. The Government's
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Immediately after President Bush issued the Kennebunkport Order, the
HCC challenged the legality of the government's new interdiction policy
and sought a temporary restraining order," 4 again on behalf of the
Haitians who have been or will be screened-in." The District Court
denied a preliminary injunction, but in an expedited appeal decided July
29, 1992, the Second Circuit reversed."
Judge Pratt, writing for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
rejected the government's argument that neither 8 U.S.C. 1253(h)(1) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, nor Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention applies to aliens outside the United States. 127 The Court held
that the plain language of both § 243(h)(1) and Article 33.1 indicate that
"what is important is the place 'to' which, not 'from' which, the refugee
is returned."" Judge Pratt concluded that "the executive's action of
reaching out into international waters, intercepting Haitian refugees, and
returning them without determining whether the return is to their
persecutors, violates § 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,"
which prohibits the return of all aliens to a country where they would
likely face persecution. 9 Likewise, returning refugees to a place where
their life or liberty is threatened violates Article 33.1. 30 Thus, the Court
held that the government's reading of Article 33.1 is "fundamentally
contrary to the Protocol's and to the Refugee Convention's 'object and
purpose' as expressed by the plain language.""3
The Second Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, and
instructed the court to grant an injunction prohibiting the government from
conduct is particularly hypocritical given its condemnation of other countries
who have refused to abide by the principle of non-refoulement. As it stands
now, Article 33 is a cruel hoax and not worth the paper it is printed on unless
Congress enacts legislation implementing its provisions or a higher court
reconsiders Bertrand [the precedential case holding that the Protocol is not self-
executing].
Id. at 36-37 (quoting Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92-CV-1258, 1992
WL 155853, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1992).
124. Id.
125. Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1354 (1992).
126. Id. at 1350.
127. Id.
128. Id. "Article 33.1 applies to all refugees, just as § 243(h)(1) of the INA applies
to all aliens, no matter where found." Id. at 1366.
129. Id. at 1361.




returning to Haiti "any interdicted Haitian whose life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 1 2  On
August 1, 1992, the Supreme Court stayed the Second Circuit's rulings
13
and granted the government's petition for a writ of certiorari on October
5, 1992.134
The Supreme Court properly reversed the Court of Appeals and held
that the President violated neither § 243(h) nor Article 33 in ordering the
Coast Guard to interdict and repatriate undocumented aliens on the high
seas."3 5 In delivering his opinion, Justice Stevens analyzed the INA's text
and structure, and in so doing, he concluded that the statutory protections
of § 243(h) of the INA apply only to aliens who reside in or have entered
across the border of the United States.1 36 Aliens who reside illegally in the
United States may be deported pursuant to an order of a formal hearing,
while aliens who have arrived at our border or who are temporarily
paroled into the United States may also be removed from our country
following an exclusion hearing.1 37 In the case that an alien proves that his
life or liberty would be threatened due to his religious or political beliefs
upon return to the country from which he came, in accordance with
§ 243(h), the Attorney General must'not return him to that country.138
The Petitioners maintained and the Court agreed that § 243(h) is not
likewise applicable to actions taken by the President or the Coast Guard
outside the borders of the United States.13 9 "Part V of the INA contains
no reference to a possible extraterritorial application."" Furthermore, the
Court notes that the general presumption that acts of Congress are not
given extraterritorial application lends support to the interpretation of §
243(h) as applying only within territory of the United States.14' The Court
also states that it would have been "extraordinary" for Congress to have
given the statute extraterritorial application in the 1980 amendment of the
Refugee Act in which the word "return" was added and the words "within
132. Id. at 1367- 68.
133. McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 3 (1992).
134. McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 52 (1992).
135. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993).
136. Id. at 2553.
137. Id. at 2552.
138. Id. at 2553.
139. Id. at 2558.
140. Id. at 2560.
141. Id.
19941
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the United States" were removed, without any discussion of that possible
effect.
1 42
Article 33 of the United Nations Convention, like § 243(h) of the
INA, is silent as to its application to actions taken extraterritorially. The
words "expel or return ('refouler')" used in Article 33.1 parallel the
words "deport or return" in § 243(h)(1). 43 The word "return", as read
in Article 33, means "repulse" rather than to "reinstate" 1" or "exclude"
rather than "send back."1 45
The drafters of the Convention and the parties to the
Protocol-like the drafters of § 243(h)-may not have
contemplated that any nation would gather fleeing refugees and
return them to the one country they had desperately sought to
escape; such actions may even violate the spirit of Article 33; but
a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated extraterritorial obligations
on those who ratify it through no more than its general
humanitarian intent. Because the text of Article 33 cannot
reasonably be read to say anything at all about a nation's actions
toward aliens outside its own territory, it does not prohibit such
actions. 146
Thus, the Court clearly holds that the President is not in violation of
§ 243(h) of the INA or Article 33 of the Convention in ordering the Coast
Guard to establish a naval blockade to intercept Haitian boat people in
their attempt to reach U.S. shores. 47 The President in so doing exercises
the power vested in him by Title 8 U.S.C. § 1182(0 which provides:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of
any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to
the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and
for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of
all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants,
142. Id. at 2561.
143. Id. at 2563.
144. Id. at 2564.
145. Id.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 2567.
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or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to
be appropriate.' 8
VIII. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION BROUGHT WITH IT
ADDITIONAL LEGAL, HEALTH AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS
President Bill Clinton's earlier campaign promise was to ensure that
Haitian asylum seekers would not be returned to Haiti "until some shred
of democracy is restored there."1 49 Yet, on March 2, 1993, the Clinton
Administration argued before the Supreme Court for the right to continue
interdicting Haitians at sea and returning them to Haiti without first
conducting asylum hearings. "o It is no wonder that President Clinton has
received much criticism for this action. Indeed, it is merely a continuation
of a Bush Administration policy that Clinton denounced as "cruel" during
his candidacy."' In an attempt to retract his foolish promises, Clinton
said, "[M]aybe I was too harsh in my criticism" of Bush."52 His political
stance had radically shifted. Clinton justifies his post-election forced-
repatriation policy by claiming that processing the asylum seekers'
applications in Haiti "is the safest thing for them."1 53 Haitian asylum
seekers must now apply for refugee status with United States consulates
in Haiti.
148. Id. at 2559 n.27.
149. Michael Kramer, The Political Interest; Putting People Second, TIME, Nov. 1,
1993, at 29
150. Linda Greenhouse, Court Is Asked to Back Haitians' Return, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
3, 1993, at A16.
151. Id. On June 9, 1992, Presidential candidate Clinton stated: "I wouldn't return
the Haitian boat people, the immigrants, until some shred of democracy was restored
there." The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: Cult of Violence; Persona Non Grata; Rights
and Wrongs (PBS television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1993) [hereinafter News Hour]. Because
of campaign promises such as this one, Mr. Clinton feared that Haitian boat people would
invade Florida by the thousands on Inauguration Day and thereafter. Id. Hence, he
changed his tune and cited humanitarian concerns about lives being lost at sea as the
reason for his decision to continue the Bush Administration interdiction policy. Id.
Haitian Refugees' lawyer and Yale University law professor, Harold Koh,
commenting on Mr. Clinton's "humanitarian" shift in policy, stated that "[r]escuing them
is one thing but returning them to their persecutors is not rescue." Id. Koh said that what
is called the "floating Berlin Wall around Haiti was put in place just before the
inauguration.' Id.
152. Greenhouse, supra note 150, at A16.
153. Kramer, supra note 149, at 29.
20919941
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As discussed above, the Supreme Court sustained the legality of the
United States interdiction policy and accepted the government's "outside
the territory" argument." 4 It held that neither § 243(h) nor the plain
language of Article 33.1 of the United Nations Refugee Convention is
applicable to Haitians interdicted at sea. 
155
During his candidacy Clinton also promised to end the immigration
ban on HIV-positive foreigners." 6 However, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
remains a "latter-day leprosarium"157 for 267 people who are HIV
positive.
In February 1993, the Senate voted to make the ban federal law."5
"This was not homophobia or xenophobia, some members insisted: it was
fiscal prudence. Letting potential AIDS patients into the United States
could result in increased health care costs." 5 9
On March 11, 1993, House Democrats also voted against President
Clinton's efforts to end the HIV immigration ban."° Congressman Cliff
Stearns expressed concern about the soundness of the policy that President
Clinton advocated.1 6' He said, "Before we open up the doors of our
country to just anyone, wouldn't it be a matter of sound public policy to
take care of our own citizens afflicted with AIDS? 62
United States Immigration and Public Health Laws deny admittance
to immigrants who have a "dangerous, contagious disease" such as
154. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993); Harold H. Koh,
atosed-Door Policy for Refugees, N.J. L. J., Aug. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Legnews Library, NJLAWJ File.
155. Sale, 113 S.Ct. at 2562-63; Koh, supra note 154, at 33. "The four swing
justices-John Paul Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Sandra Day
O'Connor-probably concluded that if Bill Clinton could live with the forced return, so
could they.- Id.
156. Anna Quindlen, Lost in Limbo, N.Y. TmEs, Feb. 24, 1993, at A19.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. "The ban's supporters estimate that caring for an infected immigrant costs
taxpayers 100,000 dollars a year." World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC News
television broadcast, Mar. 11, 1993) [hereinafter World News].
160. World News, supra note 159. "Democrats didn't want to appear to be adding to





tuberculosis ("TB"), leprosy or syphilis, as well as HIV or AIDS."s Until
now, political asylum applicants were not subject to medical exclusion."
On March 26, 1993, United States District Judge Sterling Johnson,
Jr., of the Eastern District of New York issued an interim order which
directed the United States government to provide medical care for the
HIV-positive Haitians detained in Guantanamo Bay. 16s The first group of
HIV-positive detainees arrived in Miami on April 5, 1993. Of the twenty
refugees admitted, sixteen are HIV-positive.166 Twelve of the refugees
were to live in South Florida and eight in New York City, 67 with all
twenty refugees receiving medical treatment.'" On June 8, 1993, Judge
Johnson ordered that the Haitians being held in Guantanamo Bay, due to
the immigration ban of HIV-positive immigrants, be immediately
released. 169 President Clinton did not seek a stay of Johnson's order.170
On June 21, 1993, the last of the Haitians, held for as long as 20
months' 7' in Guantanamo Bay, were released into the United States. 172
For decades, Haiti has had the highest incidence of tuberculosis in the
Western hemisphere.1 73 Studies conducted in urban and suburban Haiti,
the United States, and sub-Saharan Africa show that a significant
percentage of people with TB are HIV-positive or have full-blown
AIDS. 74 The studies also suggest that if the spread of HIV was
163. AIDS was categorized as a "dangerous contagious disease," making aliens with
AIDS inadmissible for entry into the United States. 52 Fed. Reg. 21,532 (1987) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)). A revision to this rule broadened the category to the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection. 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b)(4) (1994).
164. HIV Positive Refugees: Separate and Unequal Treatment, HAITI INSIGHT,
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controlled, at least one-fourth of the TB cases among young adult Haitians
could be prevented."7
Haitians who have AIDS and are admitted into the United States to
receive the costly medical care, present a significant health risk to the
United States' population. Haitian people have a history of poor
compliance with treatment.1 76 Poor compliance is attributed, in part, to the
widespread cultural belief among Haiti's largely illiterate population that
TB is inflicted through sorcery Y1' Other reasons for poor compliance
include loss of interest in continuing treatment after symptoms disappear
and economic barriers. 7 Regardless of the reason, this poor compliance
with medical treatment poses a grave health threat to the United States.
In an effort to end the current crisis in Haiti, President Clinton sent
six U.S. warships to surround Haiti to enforce the reimposed United
Nations trade embargo,'" which went into effect on October 18, 1993.1 °
President Clinton's display of military power was also an effort to force
Haiti's military to comply with the July 3, 1993, United Nations-mediated
accord.13 1 Pursuant to this agreement between ousted President Aristide
and Armed Forces Chief General Cedras, Cedras and other members of
the Haitian High Command were to cede their political control of Haiti
shortly before Aristide's October 30, 1993 scheduled return."1 2 In return
for their cooperation, Cedras and his men were to be given amnesty. 13
October 30th passed, and Cedras refused to step down.
The United Nations imposed a fuel and arms embargo against Haiti
on October 18, 1993.11 The so-called "four friends," namely the United
"attributable to HIV." Id. at 255.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 256.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 256, 258. One of the chief reasons for the success of some treatment
programs is that financial aid, nutritional supplements, travel expenses, and a five dollar
bonus were given to the patients who complied with treatment procedures. Id4 at 256.
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19, 1993, at 1.
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1994, at Al.
181. Aristide Wants Total Blockade of Haiti, ORLANDO SENTNE*L, Oct. 29, 1993, at
A3.
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Oct.13, 1993, at Al.
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States, France, Canada, and Venezuela, disagreed as to the extent to which
the sanctions should be imposed.lU France, Canada, and Venezuela
demanded a total trade embargo, but the United States would not join
because doing so would suspend the shipment of supplies to United States
companies in Haiti. "I Contrary to the demands of the three other friends,
the United States "extended for 60 days the embargo-exempt status of
United States companies that operate in and around Port-au-Prince."I5 7 At
the same time, the United States participated in signing a joint statement
with the other three friends that declared the "need for new comprehensive
trade sanctions aimed at the military authorities in Haiti and their
supporters. "18 On January 27, 1994, the United States Treasury declared
that it would freeze the assets of 523 Haitian military officials. This
freeze was an effort on the part of the United States to appease the other
three friends and settle the dispute about expanding the embargo and the
exemptions granted by the United States.189
In addition to the expected negative impacts upon United States
companies in Haiti and the Haitians who are victimized daily by the
leaders of the High Command, there are unexpected negative impacts such
as those upon the commercial and independent media in Haiti. o Despite
this unfortunate impairment to the innocent, a total embargo should have
been imposed in order to attempt to achieve the level of tension necessary
to force Cedras and the other members of the High Command to step
down.
IX. RESOLUTION 940: OPERATzON RESTORE DEMOCRACY
On July 31, 1994, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 940 condemning Haiti's illegal regime, reaffirming the
international community's goal to restore democracy in Haiti, and
authorizing:




189. U.S. Blocks Military Cash, HAITI INSIGHT, Mar. 1994, at 5.
190. Fuel Embargo Crushing Media, HAITI INSIGHT, Mar. 1994, at 3. Radio and
television broadcasters rely upon fuel to run their generators and are consequently being
forced to reduce their broadcasting hours and even curtail broadcasting. Newspapers,
too, are being forced to reduce their publication due to the increased costs of raw
materials needed. I&
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Member States to form a multinational force under unified
command and control and, in this framework, to use all
necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the
military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island
Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected
President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the
Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and
stable environment that will permit implementation of the
Governors Island Agreement, on the understanding that the cost
of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the
participating Member states."'1
United States military forces began moving into Haiti on September
19, 1994-their goal to restore democracy and create a stable environment.
General Raoul Cedras resigned on October 10, 1994m in response to the
visible threats of force by the United Nations mission in Haiti whose
troops had been increased to six thousand"' and pursuant to the
"compromise worked out by former President Jimmy Carter that left
neither the existing government nor the U.S. military in charge. " '9 Three
years after the coup that toppled his presidency, Father Jean-Bertrand
Aristide has returned to Haiti from exile and has been restored to office.




One need not question the severity of suffering endured by the Haitian
people. It is this suffering that has brought about the surge of immigration
that became the focus of countless legal battles waged in our courts. The
adequacy of pre-asylum screening, at first the central issue, became a side
issue secondary to the legality of interdicting Haitians at sea.
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In the spirit of immigration law, Haitian rights advocates brought to
light the human suffering and argued vigorously for the U.S. government
not to interdict Haitians at sea and to open its doors to the Haitians waiting
at the flood gates. The U.S. government argued that the letter of the law
clearly does not encompass those who had not yet reached our borders.
While recognizing that the Haitian people were suffering economically,
politically, and physically, the U.S. government, feeling its own economic
strain, could not feasibly house the Haitian nation within its borders.
The Supreme Court correctly decided Sale v. Haitian Centers Council
in holding that neither § 243(h) of the INA nor Article 33 of the United
Nations Convention has extraterritorial application, and thus, the President
is not in violation of either in ordering the Coast Guard to intercept
undocumented aliens on the high seas. In so holding, the Supreme Court
has effectively and justly enabled the United States to protect its borders
from the influx of illegal immigrants, as was the purpose of the
interdiction program.
Likewise, the United Nations Security Council's decision to pass
United Nations Resolution 940 was the right decision to be made. The
employment of a visible military force was long overdue. The United
Nations had imposed and reimposed sanctions to no avail. In the three
years past, the efforts to restore democracy in Haiti have been numerous
and, until Operation Restore Democracy, unsuccessful. Now, with the
leaders of the military junta out of the country and Aristide restored to
office, the successful implementation of the second phase of the United
Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) is crucial. It is time to concentrate on
the restoration of Haiti and to aid in achieving stability in a country whose
entire independent history has been one of instability. The most difficult
phase of UNMIH has just begun. Building a new Haiti will be no simple
task.
Julie Ann Waterman
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